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ABSTRACT  
 
This paper investigates how SME's local business environment affects its performance. 
Theoretical arguments for business environment and performance go in both directions. 
That is, on the one hand business environment enhances SME's performance; on the 
other hand it also impedes its operation. Using these arguments, we hypothesise that both 
favor treatment of local government for state-owned companies and bribery (or "speed 
money") are negatively related to SME's performance. Promotion policies of local 
government for private firm and local labour force have positive effects on SME's 
performance. We test these hypotheses in a survey data from 63 manufacturing and 
service SMEs locating in three provinces of the Mekong Delta within the period of 2011 
and 2012. Using fixed effect and random effect models, the empirical results release that 
local government's favour policies for private firms and labour force have positive effects 
on SMEs' performance. The results revealed that although bribery has positively related 
to SME's performance, this relation becomes negatively when the level of bribe is high. A 
major implication is that the study provides better understanding for SMEs in addressing 
the local environment factors, which significantly affect SMEs' performance. The results 
of this study can also be used as reference for anyone who is interested in start their own 
business providing insights into decision-making in starting a business and also for any 
SMEs which are interested in continuing to sustain and grow. In addition, bribery 
enables SMEs to use government resources, avoid red tape, and thus foster revenues. 
High levels of "speed money" increasingly absorbs the returns on SME activities, and 
distort entrepreneurial spirit and behaviour because favourable relationships with public 
officials provide entrepreneurs legitimacy and thus decrease the risk for closure. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
Overall improvement of the business environment is considered a very important 
element of market transformation success and economic reform in transition 
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countries. It is also considered one of the most crucial factors in attracting foreign 
investments and is a key catalyst for economic growth acceleration 
(Alexandrova, 2004). The business environment, in general terms, consists of the 
myriad forces that are beyond the control of firm-level management in the near 
term; thus, it can create both opportunities and threats for firms (Bourgeois, 
1980). The role of the business environment in firms' operations is supported by 
most previous studies, although their findings are mixed. Previous studies have 
provided empirical evidence that the specific local business environment in 
which a firm is embedded can make a significant contribution to its performance 
(e.g., Neneh & Vanzyl, 2012;  2014; Ng & Kee, 2012; Tu, 2012; Chittithaworn, 
Islam, Keawchana, & Yusuf, 2011; Kennerley & Neely, 2003; Tan, 1996; Tan & 
Litschert, 1994; Okoroafo, 1993). Other studies have found that these factors 
have an inverse relationship (e.g., De Jong, Phan, & van Ees, 2012; Chittithaworn 
et al., 2011; Luo, 1999; Ward, Duray, Keong Leong, & Chee-Chuong, 1995). 
These mixed results may implicitly suggest that the effect of the business 
environment on firms may vary by national or regional economic context (Ng & 
Kee, 2012; Alexandrova, 2004). In particular, firms in developed countries are 
clearly better off when their business environment is certain. However, the effect 
of their business environment on firms in transition economies, such as China, 
Thailand, or Vietnam, may be different (Chittithaworn et al., 2011). The effect 
may not even be the same in different transition economies. Therefore, we argue 
that the findings of previous studies addressing the effects of business 
environment on firms in others countries continue as an ongoing debate and may 
not be applicable to Vietnam in general or the Mekong Delta (MD) in particular. 
Such topics in this region are under-explored. Therefore, the objective of this 
study is to fill this gap by investigating how the local business environment 
affects SMEs' performance in the MD. The findings of this study provide useful 
guidance on how local government should improve the business environment by 
contributing to the competitive advantage of SMEs and enhancing their 
performance. 
 
The contributions of the paper are twofold. First, we develop a model capturing 
the relationship between the local business environment and SMEs' performance 
by extending theoretical arguments on the role of local government policy, 
"speed money", and the local labour force in SMEs' performance. Second, the 
study empirically confirms the effects of these factors on SMEs' performance by 
testing 63 manufacturing and service SMEs located in Can Tho, An Giang and 
Hau Giang. The study of these SMEs provides new insights into the importance 
of the local business environment for SME operations and for the SME literature. 
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES  
 
Studies on firm performance have drawn attention from researchers. Studies 
addressing the determinants of firm performance have focused on three broad 
factors: firm strategy (Mazdeh, Moradi, & Mazdeh, 2011; Hofer & Schendel, 
1978; Porter, 1985), firm structure or internal environment (Chang,  Hughes, & 
Hotho, 2011; LeCraw, 1984; Provan, 1989) and the external business 
environment (Tan & Liu, 2014; Chang et al., 2011; Collins, 1990). According to 
the scholars, three perspectives relate to the business environment. The first 
perspective is a focus on groups external to the organisation that impinge on its 
activities, including customers, competitors, suppliers, government policies and 
regulatory agencies. The second perspective focuses on the attributes of external 
forces, such as complexity, dynamism, and munificence (De Jong, Phan, & van 
Ees, 2011). The third perspective is concerned with managerial perceptions of 
environmental attributes, exemplified by Swamidass and Newell (1987). Given 
that all of these factors and actors can affect the future of the company, top 
managers must anticipate their effects to take advantage of opportunities, defend 
from threats, and measure the effects of both on firm performance (Nicolau, 
2005). Drawing from the literature and the social context of the MD, in this 
study, we consider the favourable treatment of state-owned companies, private 
firm promotion policy, labour availability, and corruption of local government 
the main components of the business environment in the MD. These may have 
significant effects on the performance of SMEs in the MD.  
 
We first discuss the effect of the preferential treatment of state-owned companies 
on SMEs' performance. Transition economies such as Vietnam and China have 
moved from their previously centrally planned economies, in which most firms 
were owned by the state and the private sector was not encouraged to develop, 
towards more market-oriented economies, in which development of the private 
sector has been considered the crucial catalyst of economic growth. However, 
state-owned companies continue to be preferred by the government over private 
ones, including SMEs (Maunganidze, 2013). The government's supports for state-
owned companies are implemented in several different forms, such as credit, 
investment, tax incentives and loss subsidies. These supports impose significant 
disadvantages on private firms that are in competition with state-owned ones. 
Preferential treatment of state-owned companies is evidentially a main cause of 
the sluggishness of these companies that, in turn, hampers the growth of the 
whole economy (Mazdeh et al., 2011; Ahmad, Ramayah, Wilson, & Kummerow, 
2010). Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Preferential treatment of state-owned companies by the 
government is negatively associated with SMEs' 
performance in the MD.  
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Next, we discuss the effect of private firm promotion policy on SMEs' 
performance. Historical evidence from Vietnam and China has shown that the 
increasing promotion of private enterprises by these countries has led to an 
impressive growth of SMEs. Private firm promotion policies include credit and 
tax incentives and are associated with, for example, a reduction in complexity of 
paperwork, reduction of private firms' uncertainties about regulation and 
technology, and management enhancement for SMEs (Neneh & Vanzyl, 2012). 
Moreover, it has been reported that the relationship between Chinese firms and 
their various environmental components is highly complex, heterogeneous, and 
particularistic, particularly when information is not codified and regulations are 
not made explicit (Maunganidze, 2013; Boisot & Child, 1988; Child & Lu, 
1990). An environment characterised by uncodified information can promote 
uneconomic forms of opportunism. The environment in which Chinese firms 
must make strategic decisions is similar to those described by Bird (1989), in 
which firms lack control over important resources, information, and time to react 
under incomplete information. Therefore, the policies of the government, which 
aim to reduce information uncertainty and enhance the managerial capabilities of 
SMEs, may help SMEs handle the complexity of the business environment more 
efficiently (Maunganidze, 2013; Neneh & Vanzyl, 2012; 2014). Therefore, these 
policies improve SME's performance. For these reasons, we propose the second 
hypothesis:  
 
H2: The promotion policy of local government for private firms 
is positively associated with SMEs' performance in the MD.  
 
Labour availability can affect SMEs' performance in the MD. Environmental 
munificence represents the level of resources available to firms from various 
sources in the environment and is the extent to which an environment supports 
growth of organisations within it (for example, Tan & Liu, 2014; Tan, 1996; 
Okoroafo, 1993). Thus, when investigating 319 manufacturing firms in 
Singapore, Ward et al. (1995) included quality labour availability as one of three 
scales that are conceptually related to environmental munificence. The results 
showed that the responses of low performers to concerns about environmental 
munificence such as labour availability are quite different from those of high 
performers. This finding implies that labour availability also affects firm 
performance (Wang, & Ngoasong, 2012). Several studies have also found that 
available labour force has a positive effect on overall firm performance (Tan & 
Li, 1996; 2014; Tan, 1996). Therefore, we propose the third hypothesis: 
 
H3: The local labour force in the MD is positively associated 
with SMEs' performance.  
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Svensson (2005) defined corruption as the misuse of public office for private 
gain. Corruption defined thusly would capture, for example, the sale of 
government property by government officials, kickbacks in public procurement, 
bribery and embezzlement of government funds. In addition, corruption is an 
outcome—a reflection of a country's legal, economic, cultural and political 
institutions. Corruption can be a response to either beneficial or harmful rules. 
Conversely, corruption can also arise because bad policies or inefficient 
institutions are put in place to collect bribes from individuals seeking to 
circumvent those policies or institutions (Djankov, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, & Shleifer, 2003). Therefore, Le Khuong Ninh (2007) and Tu (2012) 
asserted that "speed money" is one type of corruption. However, several scholars 
have presented different arguments about the relationship between a type of 
corruption such as "speed money" and a firm's performance. "Speed money" 
might improve firm performance, leading to increased investment through two 
mechanisms (Ramdani & van Witteloostuijn, 2012; De Jong et al., 2012). First, 
corrupt practices such as "speed money" would initially enable individuals to 
avoid bureaucratic delay. Second, government employees who are allowed to 
levy bribes would work harder, particularly in the case in which bribes act as a 
piece rate. Although the first mechanism would increase the likelihood that 
corruption would be beneficial to growth only in countries where bureaucratic 
regulations are cumbersome, the second would operate regardless of the level of 
red tape. In contrast, Shliefer and Vishny (1993) argued that corruption would 
tend to lower economic growth due to increased investment costs and a decrease 
in the marginal production of investment, leading to reductions in firm 
performance. Eventually, firm performance will decrease due to the higher cost 
burden. Considering these arguments, we propose the following hypothesis:  
 
H4: "Speed money" (bribery) is negatively related to SMEs' 
performance in the MD. 
 
Based on the developed theoretical arguments above, the theoretical framework 
of the study is presented in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Theoretical framework of the study 
 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
Data Collection, Measure and Description  
 
Data collection and sample 
 
Following the approach of Tu (2012), the sampling technique of this study 
proceeded in three stages. The first stage was the preparatory phase of the field 
survey: an existing questionnaire was modified, discussed with practitioners and 
experienced researchers, and compared with other questionnaires. The next step 
in this stage was pre-testing the questionnaire in Can Tho. This pilot survey noted 
drawbacks of the original questionnaire, which helped us improve the 
questionnaire further. The final questionnaire consisted of 31 questions that 
provided substantial information on which to base the measurement of the 
dependent and independent variables in the theoretical model. 
 
The second stage was to train selected interviewers, including students from the 
School of Economics and Business Administration (SEBA), Can Tho University, 
Vietnam. The requirements for the selected interviewers were to have experience 
in conducting fieldwork and implementing surveys. The interviewers were 
trained in the questionnaire by experienced SEBA researchers who explained 
each question. Furthermore, the interviews were implemented in the local dialect 
of Vietnamese within the MD area, in which interviewees can respond more 
easily, thus making their answers more precise. 
 
 
Local labour force  
 
 
 
 
SMEs' performance 
 
Favourable treatment for 
state-owned companies 
Promotion policy for 
private firms  
 
 
 
Bribery 
 
Control variable: size of 
SME 
 
H1: (–) 
H2: (+) 
H3: (+) 
H4: (–) 
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In the final stage, the steps of the intensive interview were conducted between 
September and December 2013. Based on the SME list from the Vietnam 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI), we contacted managers of 150 
SMEs identified in 3 of the 13 provinces/cities of the Mekong Delta by telephone 
to explain the purposes of the survey. These provinces/cities included Can Tho, 
An Giang, and Hau Giang. The reason for using these areas was three-fold. First, 
according to the VCCI, the density of SMEs is the greatest in these 
provinces/cities and the number of registered SMEs is increasing significantly. 
Second, Can Tho is located in the central area of the region, whereas An Giang 
and Hau Giang are located in the upper and the lower Mekong Delta regions, 
respectively. These provinces have different natural conditions and competitive 
advantages. Each can well represent other provinces in the MD that share 
similarly natural conditions and competitive advantages. Third, because of 
efficiency cost, we concentrated on these three provinces/cities in the MD. 
Eventually, we received agreement from 103 managers of SMEs located in the 
selected provinces/cities to join the interviews (35 for Can Tho, 30 for An Giang 
and 28 for Hau Giang). At the beginning of the interview, the interviewers 
showed their university student card and guaranteed the full anonymity of the 
company and information provided. During the interview, the main topics, such 
as revenue, costs, profits, institutional and business environment including "speed 
money", level of preferential treatment of state-owned companies, labour 
availability, private firm promotion policies, and market-penetration costs, were 
discussed. The managers were asked to provide the information for the 
mentioned aspects concerning their operations within the period 2011–2012. The 
questionnaire was conducted only if the manager was available to answer 
personally and was willing to respond to the questions with complete and correct 
information. Moreover, if the managers refused to answer or were unwilling to 
respond to "sensitive" questions due to an issue with disclosing the SME's 
confidential information, we apologised and proceeded to the next SME. In such 
cases, therefore, the questionnaires did not collect complete information.  
 
Taken together, this approach offered a satisfactory response rate. Of the 150 
prospective SMEs contacted, 103 useable responses were received. Occasionally, 
this sample included missing observations for particular items. For the regression 
analysis in Stata, all observations with missing values on any questionnaire item 
were deleted automatically. This resulted in a conservative dataset with 63 full 
observations. The resulting response rate obtained was 42%. This response rate is 
considered adequate for analysis and reporting (Aidis & van Praag, 2007). 
Therefore, our final sample was 63 SMEs who responded in the period 2011–
2012. This sample included 32 manufacturing firms (11 firms for Can Tho, 10 in 
An Giang, and 11 in Hau Giang) and 31 servicing firms (15 firms in Can Tho, 
and 8 each for An Giang and Hau Giang).  
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Measures  
 
The information gained from the survey allows us to measure dependent 
variables, independent variables and a control variable.  
 
Dependent variable 
 
The dependent variable is the SME's performance, which reflects the results of a 
SME's operation in a given period. Following previous studies (Majumdar, 
1997), this variable is measured by the ratio of the SME's profit to revenue (in 
percentage); its value ranged from 0.09 to 0.42. 
 
Independent variables 
 
Favourable treatment of state-owned companies is defined as the level of 
preferential treatment by the government of state-owned companies. In transition 
economies such as Vietnam and China, state-owned companies play a main role 
in the economy; thus, compared with SMEs, they always receive favourable 
treatment from the government. The level of preferential treatment of state-
owned companies by the government is measured on a five-point Likert scale 
ranging from 1 to 5. A higher value signifies a higher-level treatment of state-
owned companies by the government.  
 
Promotion policy for private firm is defined as the level of encouragement of the 
local governments for the development of private firms. This variable is 
measured on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 to 5. A higher value 
signifies a higher level of government promotion for a private firm. 
 
Local labour force is defined as the qualification level of the local labour force 
available in the city or province where the firms are located. In developing 
countries such as Vietnam, the percentage of people trained professionally at 
colleges or universities is low (approximately 27%). Thus, the skills of less-
educated people are mostly trained at local vocational education or training 
centres. If a region has several centres, the low-skilled workers in the region have 
many opportunities to be trained. Therefore, the qualification level of the local 
labour force is appropriately measured by the number of the local vocational 
education or training centres.  
 
Bribery ("speed money") is defined as the unofficial costs that firms pay to 
government officials to make their business activities easier and more successful. 
For example, firms may pay such costs to government officials to obtain business 
contracts with the government, to obtain permissions from the government more 
easily, or to lower the legal costs paid to the government such as tariff costs and 
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other fees. This variable is measured by the natural logarithm of annual "speed 
money" firms suffer.  
 
Control variable 
 
Several previous studies on firm performance have shown that firm size is a vital 
element of firm performance. Theoretically, the size of a firm can affect a firm's 
performance in many ways. The key features of a large firm are its diverse 
capabilities, its ability to exploit economies of scale and the formalisation of 
procedures. These characteristics, by making the implementation of operations 
more effective, can allow larger firms to generate larger returns on assets and 
sales (Majumdar, 1997). It is thus necessary to control for this factor in studies in 
firm performance. In this study, firm size is measured by the natural logarithm of 
revenue. 
Econometric Model: Panel Data Models  
 
This study employs the so-called panel data method, which refers to the pooling 
of observations across sections of firms over several periods. Panel data are able 
to overcome the shortcomings of cross-sectional data, which are often used in 
firm performance studies.  
 
The two models widely used in panel data analysis are fixed effects and random 
effects models. Each of these has different strengths and shortcomings. Choice of 
the appropriate model is primarily based on the characteristics of the data. 
Because the data are collected over two years (2011–2012), one-way 
fixed/random effect specifications are employed in this study. The following 
section introduces the two models and explains why one model was chosen over 
the other.  
 
Fixed-Effects Model (FE): Least squares dummy variable approach  
 
The most restrictive model used in panel data analysis is a pooled OLS model 
with N*T observations. Similar to the OLS model used in cross-sectional 
analysis, this model specifies constant coefficients (intercept and slopes). 
However, if individual and period-specific heterogeneities were present, OLS 
estimates would be biased if the omitted variables were correlated with the 
included explanatory variables (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005, p. 699). In panel data 
analysis, this problem can be solved or minimised by introducing dummy 
variables for every firm to account for the effects of those omitted variables 
representing individual heterogeneities (Meurs, 1991). This approach is called a 
"one-way fixed effects model" where, y
it 
= the performance measure of firm i at 
Vo Van Dut 
 110   
time t; xit
 
= a K × 1 vector of individual time-varying dependent variables: 
smoothing costs, level of preferential treatment of state-owned companies, labour 
skills, private firm promotion policies, market-penetration costs, and revenue. i 
indexes the individual (firm) in a cross section, and t indexes time. The parameter 
δi
 
represents individual-specific effects that capture individual heterogeneities. 
The econometrics packages specify a constant, α, and (N–1) dummy variables to 
capture the individual heterogeneities (δi). The idiosyncratic residual, εit, 
represents the effects of all remaining omitted variables that vary across 
individuals and periods.  
 
Similar to the OLS model, the FE model is able to yield unbiased results only if 
the assumptions of no autocorrelation, no heteroscedasticity, no correlation 
between the included explanatory variables, xit and the error term, εit, and 
normality of the residuals all hold. First, the autocorrelation problem, which 
arises if the residuals are correlated with one another, can be detected by using 
the Durbin-Watson test. This procedure tests the null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation against the alternative hypothesis of autocorrelation. If there is 
autocorrelation, the problem can be overcome by introducing a first-order 
autoregressive errors term, AR(1), into the model (Reiman & Hill, 2001, pp. 
127−128). Second, the heteroscedasticity problem, which arises if the residuals 
do not all have the same variance, may result in incorrect standard errors (Hill, 
Griffiths, & Judge,  2001, p. 238). This problem can be detected by using the 
White Heteroscedasticity test, which tests the null hypothesis of no 
heteroscedasticity against the alternative hypothesis of heteroscedasticity of some 
unknown general form. In practice, testing heteroscedasticity in panel data is 
complicated, so most econometric software packages, such as Eview 5.0, do not 
offer this test procedure. However, some packages do provide it (Arellano, 2003, 
p. 8). Nonetheless, in the FE model, dummy variables are introduced to control 
for omitted and unobserved individual-specific effects; thus, this problem is less 
likely to occur. We therefore ignore the assumption of no correlation between the 
included explanatory variables, x, and the error term, ε, in the FE models. Third, 
the normality of residuals is a vital assumption; it can be detected by using the 
Jarque-Bera Test, which tests the null hypothesis of normality against the 
alternative hypothesis of no normality using the so-called 'White diagonal 
standard errors correction' procedure. This procedure corrects standard errors if 
heteroscedasticity exists. Moreover, using this correction procedure does not 
produce unbiased results, even without heteroscedasticity. Therefore, we employ 
this correction procedure to eliminate the potential heteroscedasticity problem 
without testing whether it exists in the model. Fourth, correlation between the 
included explanatory variables, xit, and the error term, εit, primarily arises if the 
omitted variables are correlated with the explanatory variables, xit, because the 
effects of omitted variables are absorbed into the error term, εit. 
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To summarise, the main advantage of the FE model is that it allows for 
correlations between the omitted individual and period-specific variables with the 
included explanatory variables. However, the fixed-effect model continues to 
have a number of shortcomings. One of the most shortcomings of the FE model 
is that by introducing dummy variables for every individual, the degree of 
freedom decreases by the number of dummy variables and the power of the 
statistical tests thus decreases. This shortcoming may disappear in the random-
effects model. 
 
Random- Effects model (RE): An error component model  
 
In the FE model, the effects of omitted individual-specific variables (δi) are 
treated as fixed constants over individual. In the RE model, these variables, such 
as uit, are treated as random variables (Hsiao, 1986, p. 33). 
 
To obtain better estimates the generalised least squares estimator (GLS), which 
applies to a transformed model with appropriately transformed error term, is 
employed. GLS yields standard errors are appropriate for interval estimation and 
hypothesis testing (Hill et al., 2001, p. 360). The GLS model can be obtained as 
the OLS of a constant (Baltagi, 1995). 
 
Similar to the OLS and FE models, the RE model is able to yield unbiased results 
only if the assumptions of no autocorrelation, no heteroscedasticity, no 
correlation between the included explanatory variables, xit, and the error term, εit, 
and the normality of the residuals all hold. The statistical techniques and 
procedures employed to test the assumptions of no autocorrelation, no 
heteroscedasticity, and normality of residuals and to correct the problems in the 
RE model are the same as those used in the FE model. However, the error term, 
uit, contains the effect of omitted individual specific variables (δi). Thus, the RE 
model is not able to control for the omitted and unobserved individual-specific 
effects. As a result, there is more likely to be a correlation between the error term 
and the included explanatory variables in the RE model than the FE model. 
However, if there is clear evidence that the estimates of the FE and RE models 
are not significantly different, this assumption could also be ignored in the RE 
model (as in the FE model).  
 
To summarise, the main disadvantage of the RE model relative to the FE model 
is that it does not allow for correlations between the omitted individual-specific 
variables (δi) and the included explanatory variables, xit. In other words, the RE 
model is biased if correlations exist. However, compared with the FE model, the 
RE model has several advantages. One such advantage is that without introducing 
dummy variables for every individual and time period, the RE model is able to 
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save the degrees of freedom, thereby maintaining the power of the statistical 
tests.  
 
The choice between the FE and RE models is based on the characteristics of the 
data. If the omitted individual-specific variables (δi) are not correlated with xit, 
the calculations of the RE model would not be significantly different from those 
of the FE model. In this case, the RE model would be preferred because it is able 
to save the degrees of freedom. In contrast, if the RE model is biased due to the 
correlations of δi with xit, the FE should be chosen. The F-test will be employed 
to test for the choice between the FE and RE models. This procedure tests the 
null hypothesis that the RE model would be consistent and efficient against the 
alternative hypothesis that the RE model would be inconsistent and the FE model 
thus preferred.  
 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
Description, Specification and Empirical Test  
 
Tables 1 and 2 report the descriptive statistics and the correlation coefficients of 
pair variables, which enable us to detect whether there is multi-collinearity 
among independent variables. As shown in Table 1, the interviewed SMEs 
gained on average an annual profit of 17.32% of revenue. The highest ratio of 
profit to revenue is 91%, whereas the lowest one is only 0.75%. On a scale 
ranging from 1 to 4, the level of favourable treatment by the government of state-
owned companies is on average 3.08, demonstrating that this preferential 
treatment remains high in the MD. In contrast, the private firm promotion policy 
of the local government is evaluated to be relatively low. The average of the 
private firm promotion index is 2.40 on a scale ranging from 1 to 5. The number 
of local vocational education or training centres in a province in the MD is on 
average 2.40. As shown in Table 1, a SME must pay an average of 3.88 million 
VND to a government official to make their business easier and more successful, 
which is approximately 0.20% of revenue. The highest speed cost a firm pays is 
20 million VND, whereas the lowest one is 0.74 million VND. Each SME 
interviewed on average obtains revenue of 6.055 million VND. The highest 
revenue is 21 million VND, whereas the lowest revenue is 1.383 million VND.  
 
Table 1 shows that there is not a high correlation between pairs of independent 
variables. However, the difficulty with examining only pairwise correlations is 
that they may not reveal multicollinearity relationships involving more than two 
of the independent variables (Hill et al., 2001, p. 190). 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics and correlation matrix of the variables 
 
 Variables R2 Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 
1 SME performance (%)  17.3 21.9      
2 Bribery/"speed money" (log) 0.30 3.61 1.11 0.60     
3 
Favour treatment             
for state-owned 
companies 
0.33 3.08 0.82 –0.67 –0.46    
4 Promotion policy for private firm 0.31 2.43 0.64 0.77 0.46 –0.44   
5 Local labour force 0.17 4.26 2.32 0.40 0.19 –0.31 0.10  
6 SME size (log) 0.11 15.3 0.73 –0.09 0.05 –0.05 0.20 –0.25 
 
Note: R2 is the R2 of the so-called auxiliary regressions. In the regressions, the left-hand variable is an 
explanatory variable and the right-hand variables are all of the remaining explanatory variables. 
 
This problem can be overcome by introducing so-called "auxiliary regressions", 
in which the left-hand variable is one of the explanatory variables and the right-
hand variables are all of the remaining explanatory variables. As shown in the 
second column of Table 1, the R-squared values of the auxiliary regressions are 
relatively low, all being smaller than 0.35. The result demonstrates the non-
existence of multicollinearity. Therefore, all of the independent variables are 
included in the models.  
 
The results of the FE and RE models are presented in Table 2. In this table, the   
F-test is employed to test the choice between the FE and RE models; it suggests 
that the estimates of the RE model are unbiased, so the RE models are preferred 
over the FE models in this study. Consequently, the present study focuses only on 
interpreting the results of the RE model. As mentioned in the research method 
section, the estimators of the RE models are the best linear unbiased estimators 
(BLUE) only if these four assumptions all hold: no autocorrelation, no 
heteroscedasticity, no correlation between the included explanatory variables, xit, 
and the error term, εit, and the normality of residuals.  
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Table 2 
The results of fixed and random effect models − Dependent variable: SME performance 
 
 Fixed effects model Random effects model 
Favour treatment for state-owned 
companies 
 –2.0143 –2.6457 
(1.1909) (2.1647) 
Promotion policy for private firm 45.1394*** 29.0434*** 
 (1.6383) (3.1727) 
Local labour force 1.7272** 2.3222*** 
 (0.8345) (0.8219) 
Bribery (log) 0.5203** 1.8181** 
 (0.2463) (0.8978) 
Size (log)           –0.1675 –5.2554*** 
 (1.9075) (1.8605) 
Constant –110.5481*** 19.0126 
 (29.9921) (32.8305) 
R-squared 0.7919 0.7639 
Adjusted R-squared 0.7809 0.7513 
S.E. of regression 3.0318 3.7595 
Sum squared residual 229.7991 763.2170 
Durbin-Watson stat 3.8710 2.0529 
F-statistic 90.2994 68.5398 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 
Observations (2 years) 126 126 
F-Test (Random/fixed effect test)   
  – F  1.9210 
  – F–critical value  1.9453 
  – Result (Biased/unbiased)  Unbiased 
 
: ***, **, *, indicate significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (p < 0.01, 0.05, 0.10), respectively. White 
diagonal standard errors and covariance are presented in parentheses. 
)/(
)1/()(
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NSSESSEF
U
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−−
−−
= , F–critical value = F(N–1), [N(T–1) –K]. K is the number of independent variables in 
the model. SSER is the SSE of the random-effect model and SSEU is the SSE of the fixed-effect model. 
 
As previously explained, we can employ the so-called "White diagonal standard 
errors correction" procedure to eliminate the potential heteroscedasticity problem 
without detecting its existence. The assumption of no correlation between the 
included explanatory variables and error term would be ignored in the RE models 
if there is statistical evidence that there is no difference between the estimates of 
the FE and RE models. Therefore, the two remaining assumptions must be tested. 
First, as shown in column 3 of Table 2, the Durbin-Watson value of the RE 
model is 2.05. Because the value is greater than the critical upper-bound value 
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(dU) for the Durbin-Watson test at the significance level of 5%, being 
approximately 1.86, the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation is accepted. Hence, 
the assumption of no autocorrelation holds in the RE model. Second, the result 
shows that the p-values of the Jarque-Bera test for the two FE models are equal to 
0.37. This result means that the null hypothesis of the normality of residuals is 
accepted; thus, the residuals are normally distributed. To summarise, it is 
concluded that the estimates of the RE model are reliable and unbiased. 
Regression Outcomes and Discussion  
 
Favourable treatment of state-owned companies 
 
The result does not support H1 (p > 0.05), which predicted that the level of 
favourable treatment by the government of state-owned companies is negatively 
associated with SMEs' firm performance. The favourable treatment by the 
government of state-owned companies is found not to have an effect on SMEs' 
performance for the following reasons. First, state-owned firms always rely on an 
allowance from the government budget; they are therefore sluggish and lack 
incentive for creating alternative strategies or fostering technology and 
innovation capabilities to generate and sustain their competitive advantages over 
SMEs. Second, although the preferential treatment of state-owned companies by 
the government remains high, the support of the government of private firms has 
been dramatically increasing. Therefore, state-owned companies no longer obtain 
significant competitive advantages over SMEs because the differential supports 
that the two forms of companies receive from the government are not as high as 
in the past under the centrally planned economy. This can partly explain the fact 
that the contribution of SMEs in Vietnam to economic growth is higher than that 
of state-owned companies. In particular, the industrial output of SMEs was 
46.3% (increasing from 39% in 2011) of the total output in 2012, whereas the 
contribution of state-owned enterprises accounted for only 40% (decreasing from 
46.9% in 2011) (Phan, Truong, & Vo, 2012).  
 
Promotion policy for private firm 
 
The result significantly supports H2, which suggests that the private firm 
promotion policy is positively associated with SMEs' performance in the MD                  
(p < 0.01). Local authorities launch the policies and laws that encourage private 
investments in their region, which creates numerous opportunities for the 
development of SMEs in the MD. If a certain city or province had applicable 
policies promoting private firms, the performance of SMEs in that city or 
province would be improved. Thus, the local government in the MD needs to 
define and implement efficient policies that are able to promote the development 
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of SMEs, which in turn significantly contribute to overall economic growth. This 
is in line with the SME literature suggesting that improvements in the 
institutional environment are necessary for improving SME performance, leading 
to increased investment (Maunganidze, 2013; Okoroafo, 1993). Taken together, 
the government's policies, which aim to reduce information uncertainty and to 
enhance the managerial capabilities of SMEs, help SMEs handle the complexity 
of the business environment more efficiently (e.g., Maunganidze, 2013; Neneh & 
Vanzyl, 2012; 2014; Child & Lu, 1990). 
 
Local labour force 
 
H3, predicting a positive relationship between labour availability and SMEs' 
performance, is significantly supported (p < 0.01). It indicates that SMEs obtain 
high profit when they are located in cities or provinces where there are several 
training centres or local vocational education organisations. This result supports 
the findings of previous studies. For example, several scholars showed that the 
level of resources available to firms from various sources in the environment 
affect the extent to which an environment supports the growth of organisations 
within it (Tan, 1996; Okoroafo, 1993; Ward et al., 1994). According to them, 
labour availability in particular is the critical resource for improving firm 
performance. In other words, the present finding emphasises again that labour 
availability positively affects SME's performance or firm performance (Tan & 
Liu, 2014; Wang & Ngoasong, 2012). Hence, local authorities should encourage 
and support the established training centres or educational institutions. Again, the 
findings of the current study confirm that the local workforce – i.e., the quality of 
labour – plays a crucial role contributing directly to SME performance (Wang & 
Ngoasong, 2012).  
 
Bribery/"Speed money" 
 
The result of the random effect model in Table 2 shows that "speed money" has a 
significant effect on SMEs' performance but that this effect is positive. This result 
is opposite to the prediction of H2. There are some possible explanations for this 
result. First, business and other interactions between SMEs and the local 
government are low compared with the interactions of state-owned companies 
and local government. As a result, the amount of money a SME grants to a local 
official to accomplish things is very small in relation to profit (approximately 
0.20% of the profit as mentioned above). SMEs are thus not highly elastic with 
respect to this cost. The benefit that a SME receives by paying the speed cost to 
accomplish tasks may be higher than this cost. This figure may also demonstrate 
that the corruption problem in the MD remains low and under control. Second, 
SMEs are normally willing to provide some government officials some incentives 
to obtain business contracts with the government, whose benefit would be very 
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high. However, the "speed cost" becomes a serious problem for the overall 
economy when it becomes an "unwritten law", and it may support bad firms that 
obtain advantages via the speed money, thereby indirectly eliminating well-
performing firms. Therefore, although this study finds a positive association 
between corruption and SMEs' performance, the local government needs to have 
a strong commitment to reduce or eliminate illegal activities as soon as possible 
because they will have dangerously negative effects on SMEs and the whole 
economy when they become serious and out of control. This finding again 
confirms that bribery facilitates SME performance, which is consistent with 
bargaining theory predictions. That is, small- and medium-sized firms are more 
likely to pay bribes because they have fewer resources to tap than have their 
larger counterparts in the bribery game (Svensson, 2003; 2005). 
 
Control variable 
 
The result concerning size of SME in the RE model is supported at the 
statistically significant level of 1% (p < 0.01). This result reflects the fact that 
higher SME revenue results in lower SME performance. This is completely true 
in the present study because we measure the dependent variable by the ratio of 
profit to revenue; when a SME's revenue increases, this ratio decreases. 
Therefore, we consider revenue a control variable in the RE model. This finding 
is in line with findings of previous studies (Tu, 2012; Majumdar, 1997). These 
studies indicated that the key features of a large firm are its diverse capabilities, 
its ability to exploit economies of scale and the formalisation of procedures. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH  
 
Conclusions 
 
We investigate the effects of the external environment – local government 
policies and corruption – on SMEs' performance in the MD. In particular, the 
government policies considered in this study include those associated with 
preferential treatment of state-owned companies, private firm promotion policy, 
and labour availability, whereas corruption is perceived as "speed money" 
measured by the amount of money that SMEs unofficially pay government 
officials to accomplish tasks. The most important contribution of this paper is the 
examination of how the external environment and corruption in the MD jointly 
affect the performance of SMEs operating in this area. To this end, a two-step 
estimation procedure was employed to analyse panel data of 63 SMEs in a two-
year period (2011–2012) in the MD to estimate the effect of the local business 
environment on SMEs' performance.  
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Private firm promotion policy and labour availability are found to have positive 
effects on SMEs' performance. These results reflect that private promotion 
policies and labour availability are critical determinants of SMEs' performance in 
the MD. These findings contrast with preferential treatment of state-owned 
companies, which is found to be unrelated to SMEs' performance. For the 
corruption of local government officials, the empirical result suggests a positive 
association between corruption and SMEs' performance. However, this positive 
association is found in the context of corruption remaining low and under control 
in the MD. The association will become negative when bribery increases. The 
local government therefore needs to note and implement corruption-reducing 
solutions to secure sustainable development of SMEs and the economy. 
 
Implications 
 
A major implication is that these findings provide a better understanding for 
SMEs in addressing the local environment factors that significantly affect SMEs' 
performance. Studying the factors that affect SMEs' performance is critical to 
understanding business continuity and growth and, hence, to supporting 
economic development within a region – in this case, the MD. The results of this 
study can also be used as a reference for anyone who is interested in starting their 
own business – the results will provide insights into decision-making in starting a 
business – and for any SME that is interested in continuing to operate and grow. 
In addition, the study has an important implication for how "speed money" 
(bribe) enables SMEs to use government resources, avoid red tape, and thus 
foster revenues. High levels of "speed money" increasingly absorb the returns 
from SME activities and distort entrepreneurial spirit and behaviour (Tu, 2012; 
De Jong et al., 2012; Le Khuong Ninh, 2007). In addition, bribes facilitate SME 
performance through acquiring higher levels of social capital because building 
such social capital will have a positive effect on performance through at least two 
different interdependent channels of influence. First, bribes increase trust and 
establish a shared belief of reciprocity (De Jong et al., 2012; Graeff, 2005). 
Through bribes, managers of SMEs obtain favourable treatment that will increase 
their revenues due to the higher chance of winning government projects or 
obtaining loans (Tu, 2012). Second, bribes are investments in networks that 
overcome the liabilities of "newness" or "smallness" (Aldrich, 1979). Favourable 
relationships with public officials provide entrepreneurs legitimacy and thus 
decrease the risk of closure. Taken together, bribery facilitates SME 
performance, which is in line with bargaining theory (Svensson, 2003; 2005). 
The latter stresses that small- and medium-sized firms are more likely to pay 
bribes because they have fewer resources to tap than have their larger 
counterparts in the bribery game. Another practical implication of the study is 
that local government should play a leading role in serving the needs of SMEs by 
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training the labour force on how to access the incentives available to them 
because the local labour force has a positive relationship with SME performance. 
 
Limitations and Future Research 
 
This study has a number of limitations that offer opportunities for future research. 
First, the business environment has additional aspects – firm strategy (Tan & Liu, 
2014; Chang et al., 2011; Hofer & Schendel, 1978; Porter, 1985), firm structure 
or internal environment (Maunganidze, 2013; Chang et al., 2011; LeCraw, 1984) 
– that need to be included in the model. Second, the selected sample primarily 
focuses on the three provinces/cities. The empirical findings may not apply to 
other SMEs in Vietnam because the characteristics of each region most likely 
differ (Tu, 2012). Future research may extend the database to address this issue. 
Third, our study includes many types of SME businesses, namely manufacturing 
and service SMEs; we did not focus on a specific business type of SME in the 
MD. Thus, it could be that samples in further research focus only on SMEs with a 
specific business type, for example manufacturing or service, which would allow 
for a cross-validation of the results presented in this paper (Ahmad et al., 2010).  
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